Speaking of accounting scandals... by Jagadeesh Gokhale
Just as the federal government is oblig-
ated to service its outstanding debt, how-
ever, it is also bound by law to pay Social
Security and Medicare benefits to eligible
individuals. Although the government
could legally change existing laws to
abrogate all or most Social Security and
Medicare benefits, the likelihood of this is
extremely small—about the same order
of magnitude as the likelihood that the
government would repudiate its explicit
debt. Under current tax laws, payroll tax
revenues are projected to be insufficient
to fully pay promised benefits. Although
Social Security and Medicare benefits
may be trimmed, the reductions are
unlikely to be sufficient to preclude 
future tax hikes—especially as aging
baby boomers exert substantial political
pressure to preserve benefit levels. 
Outstanding Treasury securities imply
that all past federal expenditures were
not paid for by taxes; some were
financed through debt issues, which
must be serviced. Future taxes must
exceed future spending to accommodate
the debt service. In like manner, the 
fact that Social Security and Medicare
benefits paid to retirees in the past
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The better the information stock-
holders have about a firm’s prospec-
tive finances, the better their decisions
on investing their money productively.
The same is true of lawmakers’
decisions on how to allocate public
funds. As the Enron– Andersen deba-
cle has made so abundantly clear,
murky financial reporting can lead to
devastating consequences. Is some-
thing similar happening with the way
government finances are reported—
especially with regard to Social 
Security and Medicare?
T he terrorist attacks on and after 
September 11, the antiterror war in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, the
Enron–Andersen implosion, intensified
conflict in the Middle East and now
South Asia have yanked our attention
from the prior, seemingly more serene
debate over the future of Social Security
and Medicare. One year ago, we were
congratulating ourselves on a job well
done in turning the federal budget away
from generating deficits each year. Then,
we were debating not whether, but how
to secure budget surpluses for our future
needs. Now, however, fiscal resources
must be reallocated toward combating
terrorism, improving defense capabili-
ties, and providing fiscal stimulus pack-
ages to prop up the economy. The new
post–September 11 and post-Enron 
realities may prove costly in the long
term, both directly by sucking up scarce
budgetary resources and indirectly as
they divert policymakers’attention from
developing urgently needed reforms of
public retirement and health programs.
The misrepresentation by Enron’s exec-
utives of their firm’s balance sheet and
the ongoing debate about the correct
accounting treatment of stock options
have cast a bright spotlight on financial
(mis)reporting and its consequences.
Two key questions have surfaced in the
aftermath of the scandal: Are current
accounting standards adequate to ensure
accurate representations of firms’finan-
cial conditions, and will adopting differ-
ent standards affect investor behavior? 
Both questions, it turns out, are also re-
levant to the debate about the future of
Social Security and Medicare. For one,
how should the value of Social Security
and Medicare’s implicit liabilities be
estimated? Second, to what extent do
incorrect estimates, misrepresentations,
or the complete elimination of such
items from the government’s financial
reports affect the decisions of policy-
makers and individuals and, by implica-
tion, the economy?
The federal government reports its assets
and liabilities in the annually released
Budget of the United States and also 
projects how revenues and expenditures
will affect its balance-sheet position over
the next five years.1 Social Security and
Medicare obligations to retirees beyond
the five-year horizon, net of the taxes
available to pay them, are not reported.
Is this appropriate? This Economic 
Commentary suggests that the failure to
appropriately account for the net implicit
liabilities of Social Security and
Medicare may be distorting lawmakers’
allocation of scarce federal tax dollars
today, and it may have induced them into
promising more generous benefits than
can be financed from tax dollars avail-
able tomorrow.
 What’s at Stake?
The Budget of the United States, usually
released early during each calendar year,
includes the administration’s spending
and revenue proposals that are the basis
for congressional debates on budget pri-
orities and options for the next fiscal
year. A simplified version of the federal
government’s budget and debt report is
given in table 1.
The budget statement shows annual flows
of receipts and outlays. The last row in
the table shows how annual flows affect
outstanding federal debt. The budget 
indicates that federal indebtedness to the 
public at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2002
amounted to $3,477 billion. If the budget
totals for FY2003 are realized, federal
indebtedness will increase $93 billion to
$3,570 billion—about a third of projected
U.S. GDP in fiscal year 2003.exceeded their payroll tax payments,
taxes on future workers will have to be
larger than the benefits they receive to
make up the difference. This “implicit”
liability now manifests itself as an
excess of projected benefits relative to
assets plus projected payroll tax rev-
enues. Paying Social Security and
Medicare benefits at or near currently
promised levels implies higher future
taxes. So the two types of federal oblig-
ations are similar in their impact on
future taxpayers.Therefore, both should
receive similar treatment in reports of
federal financial health. Nevertheless,
official federal budgets and balance
sheets do not contain estimates of the
sizes of Social Security’s and
Medicare’s net implicit liabilities.
  The Need for Truth
in Advertising
When confronted with this argument,
supporters of the status quo in Social
Security accounting point out that Social
Security and Medicare trustees already
publish detailed reports of those pro-
grams’financial condition, including 
75-year-ahead projections of revenues
and outlays. But whether the information
contained in those reports reliably por-
trays the true financial condition of these
programs is debatable. A case in point is
the reported size of the “actuarial bal-
ance” of the Social Security and
Medicare programs—which most
observers cite as the core message of the
trustees’reports. 
The long-term actuarial balance of Social
Security, for example, is derived from
outlay and revenue projections expressed
as a percentage of projected payroll over
a horizon of 75 years. We learn from the
2002 Social Security trustees’report that
the “summarized cost rate” of the pro-
gram over the next 75 years is 15.59 per-
cent. This rate is the ratio of the present
value of total outlays to the present value
of total payroll during the next 75 years.
Total outlays include benefit payments,
administrative expenses, scheduled 
transfers to other trust funds, and a target
value of the trust fund at the end of 
75 years equal to projected benefit pay-
ments in the 76th year. We also learn that
the “summarized income rate” over the
next 75 years will be 13.72 percent,
where income includes revenues from
payroll taxes and taxation of Social 
Security benefits. Note, however, that
income also includes the nonmarketable
Treasury securities held in the Social
Security trust fund.
The shortfall of the income rate over the
cost rate, 1.87 percentage points, is the
“summarized actuarial balance.” The
report highlights this number as repre-
senting the “actuarial deficit” during the
next 75 years, assuming Social Security
pays benefits over this time span accord-
ing to current law. Many observers and
analysts readily interpret this number as
implying that taxes would have to rise
today by a mere 1.87 percentage points
of payroll to restore the program to
financial solvency.
Closer examination reveals several prob-
lems with this method of representing
Social Security’s financial shortfall.
First, it is clear from the method of cal-
culating the summarized income rate
that the term “Social Security trust fund”
is a misnomer. Because the trust fund
exclusively holds specially issued Trea-
sury securities, it merely represents an
accounting mechanism indicating the
amount of past Social Security surpluses
that were deposited with the Treasury.
Second, the availability of Social Secu-
rity surpluses enables politicians to
increase government spending without
incurring the political cost associated
with raising non–Social Security taxes to
pay for it.
The function of the so-called “trust
fund,” then, is only to indicate the extent
to which Social Security is authorized to
siphon future tax dollars from the Trea-
sury to pay Social Security’s expenses. It
does not represent a claim against an
independent, nontax source of income
based on claims against real invested
capital. When it becomes necessary to
reclaim dollars from the Treasury, the
outflow must be financed by levying
additional (nonpayroll) taxes or by cut-
ting non–Social Security outlays. This
situation will arise in 2017, much earlier
than the widely advertised date of trust
fund insolvency—2041. 
How much extra taxes must be levied 
(or outlays cut) to redeem the trust
funds’Treasury securities can be gauged
by the difference between the summa-
rized income rate (13.72 percent) and 
the current statutory payroll tax rate
(12.4 percent) plus the rate of benefits
taxation (0.69 percent). This difference
equals 0.63 percentage point of annual
payroll. Hence, the total change in 
payroll taxes (or benefits) required to
achieve actuarial balance over the next
75 years is not 1.87 percentage points,
but that plus 0.63 percentage point—or
2.5 percentage points.
This shows that the Social Security
Administration’s method of reporting
the shortfall in tax revenues is incom-
plete, at best. First, the true nature of 
the trust fund—an accounting mecha-
nism for authorizing and legitimizing
future tax increases, not a repository of
claims on income-generating assets—
is camouflaged in the arcane language
of summarized income, cost, and actuar-
ial balance rates. Second, the payroll tax
hike required to meet future benefit
obligations is understated by about a
quarter of the total.
Troubling aspects of Social Security’s
accounting do not end here. Note that the
projection horizon extends only 
NOTE: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
SOURCE: Budget of the United States Government, fiscal year 2003.
FY2002 FY2003
Total receipts 1,946 2,048
Individual and corporate income taxes 1,151 1,212
Social insurance taxes 708 749
Old age, survivors, disability, and hospital insurance 657 669
Excise and other taxes 87 87 
Total outlays 2,052 2,128
Discretionary and emergency 740 789
Social Security 456 472
Medicare 223 231
Net interest 178 181
Other outlays 455 456
Surplus/deficit (–) –106 –80
Other borrowing requirements –51 –13
Debt held by the public (end of year) 3,477 3,570
TABLE 1 THE FEDERAL BUDGET (billions of dollars)75 years. A quick look at revenue and
outlay projections shows that surpluses
will occur during the first few years
(until 2016) and will be followed by
deficits extending beyond the 75-year
horizon. So, over time, successive 
75-year projections will show the sys-
tem’s financial condition deteriorating
as additional deficit years enter the
summarized income and cost calcula-
tions. Indeed, the record of the past 
30 years provides evidence of precisely
this process at work: Although the 
1983 Social Security reforms left the
system with a slight actuarial surplus
over the next 75 years, the program’s
actuarial deficits have worsened 
considerably since. 
If we implement a tax hike equivalent 
to 2.5 percentage points of payroll to
restore Social Security’s finances for 
the next 75 years, the condition of Social
Security finances will appear just as it
does today, say, 30 years hence. We will
find ourselves faced with the need to
hike taxes again and re-engaged in the
same old Social Security reform debate.
How high must taxes be hiked to perma-
nently eliminate Social Security’s finan-
cial shortfall? One estimate places Social
Security’s actuarial deficit through the
infinite future at 4.7 percentage points
(Goss 1999). That means the tax hike
required to permanently cure Social
Security’s financial ailment is slightly
over 5.33 percentage points—a far cry
from the 1.87 percentage points high-
lighted in the trustees’reports. 
  Remedies?
Most would agree that greater trans-
parency in accounting practices would
improve the allocation of scarce invest-
ment funds. There seems no reason why
this principle is not just as applicable to
the accounting of public funds as to pri-
vate ones. Some of the nation’s top eco-
nomic gurus advocate reforming private
accounting standards to better reflect
items such as employee compensation
through stock options, liabilities of part-
ner firms, and the like. Recent research
suggests that including such informa-
tion in companies’annual reports influ-
ences firms’stock prices in the expected
direction (see Aboody, Barth, and
Kasznik 2001, for example). That is,
properly declaring assets and liabilities
induces decisionmakers (investors, leg-
islators, voters, etc.) to better evaluate
the costs and benefits of alternative
resource allocations, and better resource
allocation helps make the economy
more efficient.
This reasoning dictates that federal lia-
bilities should be declared fully and as
transparently as possible so that law-
makers and the public can make fully
informed decisions. Should information
about future federal obligations be
cloaked, as it is today, in the language of
actuarial calculations, or should it be
made comparable to other information
that people already understand and
use—such as the magnitude, in today’s
dollars, of explicit federal debt? It seems
crucially important to appropriately esti-
mate and officially report Social Secu-
rity’s future net liabilities in the govern-
ment’s fiscal statements.
If total net indebtedness on account of
Social Security and Medicare were
included in the federal budgets and bal-
ance sheets, what would the numbers
look like? 
Extending the 75-year projections for
Social Security and Medicare and calcu-
lating the present-value difference
between revenues and outlays using a
real 3.5 percent discount rate—the rate
the government pays to borrow funds
from the public—yields the following
estimates: Under intermediate economic
and demographic assumptions, Social
Security’s net implicit liability amounts
to $8.5 trillion dollars. That of Medicare
turns out to be a whopping $22 trillion
dollars. Their combined net liability,
then, is $30 trillion—or three times cur-
rent annual U.S. GDP. Keep in mind,
too, that additional net implicit liabili-
ties are associated with the provision of
other benefits and public goods through
programs such as food stamps, Aid to
Dependent Children, public employee
pensions, national defense, and others. 
 Will It Make a Difference?
At issue here is not whether Social Secu-
rity and Medicare face financial short-
falls (they do), but whether explicitly
acknowledging the shortfalls in official
federal budgets and balance sheets would
make any difference. More precisely,
what can we say about the likely impact
of alternative accounting conventions on
politicians’current resource-allocation
decisions? Does it matter whether the
federal government’s accounts are pre-
sented with or without explicit acknowl-
edgment of future Social Security and
Medicare liabilities?
The correct answer here is “we don’t
really know.” However, a claim that it will
matter does not seem entirely unjustified.
For one, a better-informed public might
exert political pressure to reform these
programs earlier than otherwise. Second,
lawmakers may exert greater caution
before making costly benefit promises
and spending commitments if they are
made aware of the true magnitude of the
existing funding shortfalls in easily com-
prehensible terms. After all, past legisla-
tive history contains hints that lawmakers
are more fiscally disciplined during times
when reported deficits are high and ris-
ing, and less so during times of reported
surpluses. Politicians have shown them-
selves to be more likely to control their
appetite for spending when Social Secu-
rity surpluses are small and cannot be
used to mask the size of overall federal
budget deficits. 
Federal budget history during the last
two decades shows that during the early
and mid-1980s, federal “on-budget”
deficits were very large, but Social
Security surpluses were barely positive.
Budget projections indicated growing
deficits and induced Congress to enact
the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act in 1985 in an
attempt to control large and soaring
federal deficits. Although many serious
budgeters believe this act proved 
ineffective, federal deficits did fall for 
a few years after it was enacted. More-
over, past budget data show cuts in dis-
cretionary nondefense outlays—which
fell as a share of GDP—may have con-
tributed to lowering federal deficits. 
Social Security surpluses became larger
during the late 1980s, reducing pressure
on lawmakers to continue with stringent
cuts in nondefense spending. Further-
more, overall deficits resumed their
upward course after 1989, prompting 
the introduction of a multiyear deficit-
reduction package and the enactment 
of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA).
The BEA placed stringent caps on 
discretionary spending and imposed
pay-as-you-go financing constraints on
revenues and mandatory outlays. The
BEA was subsequently renewed twice,
extending it through fiscal year 2002.
With the end of the Cold War in 1990,
however, defense spending could be
retrenched more rapidly to meet the
BEA’s spending caps, and pressure to
further reduce nondefense spending
remained weak. Although total discre-
tionary spending declined as a share of
GDP, none of it resulted from cuts in
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More recently, projections of gigantic 
federal surpluses, together with a greater
need for spending on national defense,
mean that the BEA is unlikely to be
extended further. Rather, federal outlays
are now guaranteed to scale new heights.
As the size of the federal government
expands, prospects that the earlier 
projected federal surpluses will ever
materialize are growing dimmer. In 
this environment, a system of public
accounting that clearly acknowledges
the size of outstanding net federal 
liabilities, both implicit and explicit,
might lend greater foresight and temper
lawmakers’appetite for ever-larger
increases in federal spending. 
  Conclusion
Current debates about reforming
accounting conventions in the private
sector seem just as applicable to the issue
of accounting in the public sphere. In
particular, current official reports on 
federal finances do not appropriately and
explicitly acknowledge the size of Social
Security and Medicare’s net implicit 
liabilities. These are gigantic and
should be incorporated in our calculus
for balancing today’s desires against
tomorrow’s needs.
  Footnotes
1. See Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment, Fiscal Year 2003, summary
table 2, Washington, D.C.:  Government
Printing Office. 
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